

Chapter 4

Beyond Humanitarian Interest: America's Aid, Inclusion, and Investment in Xinjiang Kazakh Refugees in Kashmir

Ryosuke Ono
Waseda University

Abstract

This article focuses on the manner in which Kazakh refugees who had fled from Xinjiang in 1949 and 1950 attracted American interest. These refugees were housed in refugee camps in Srinagar and finally immigrated to Turkey. American aid was extended to them through missionaries and by an anthropologist. Simultaneously, however, the involvement of the Americans caused the politicization of the Kazakh refugees with respect to Kashmir-related issues. American interests at the local level were highlighted by Adlai Stevenson's visit.

J. Hall Paxton, the ex-American consul to Urumqi, maintained his attention on the Xinjiang refugees. This article considers the correspondence exchanged between Paxton and the Uyghur refugees who arrived in Srinagar earlier as a model of his efforts to include Kazakh migrants within America's favor. This attention stemmed from both humanitarian interest and, more importantly, the strategic value of the refugees.

Paxton's appeal to Washington resulted in the adaption of the United States Escapee Program to incorporate Kazakh refugees, enabling their migration to Turkey. However, this program intended to utilize qualified escapees in covert operations. For the Americans, the Kazakh refugees represented the possibility of fulfilling their "political, psychological and intelligence" purposes, and could be considered as candidates for "Phase B" of America's operations against Soviet Russia.



1. Introduction

As Kara and Kul have argued in their chapters, the second wave of Kazakh refugees from Xinjiang included prominent personalities such as Alibek Hakim, Delilhan Canaltay, Hüseyin Teyci, and Sultan Şerif. These refugees, except Hüseyin Teyci's group, were forced to leave northern Xinjiang in 1949 and 1950 due to the advance of the People's Liberation Army into Xinjiang. They suffered from thirst, altitude sickness, and extremely cold temperatures as they crossed the Taklamakan Desert, Tibet, and the Himalaya Mountains. Moreover, they feared that the Chinese communist soldiers would catch up with them. Most of the refugees managed to reach Ladakh in August 1951 despite the serious loss of their livestock, their households, and even the lives of many of their peers. They were finally permitted to enter Indian territory,¹ and moved to Srinagar, where they were settled in two refugee camps, Serai Safa Kadal and Kak Serai, used for the caravanserai of Yarkandi merchants. It is estimated that around 340 refugees stayed at these camps.² Ultimately, the refugees immigrated to Turkey between 1952 and 1954 and were settled in various cities of Anatolia such as Salihli (Manisa) and Ulukışla (Niğde).

The story of their escape from communist rule has been told by scholars, travelers, journalists, and by other migrants. Some remarkable narratives apart from Ingvar Svanberg's survey, *Kazak Refugees in Turkey* (1989) include: Godfrey Lias's *Kazak Exodus* (1956), Milton Clark's article in *National Geographic Magazine* (1954), and Frank Bessac's autobiography titled *Death on the Chang Tang* (2006). In particular, a color photo of Alibek on horseback published with Clark's *National Geographic* article³ has served as a symbol for freedom seekers who escaped communist pressure to settle in Turkey along with the Kazakh refugees.

The texts mentioned above focus on the process of the exodus of Kazakh refugees from their homeland to the "free world" and narrate the tragic experiences they encountered on the way. In fact, the value they offered to American interests have not been accorded much attention. The mere attribution of a longing for free-

¹ *The Times* (London), Aug. 8, 1951; Oct. 6, 1951; Oct. 22, 1951; Nov. 3, 1951; Nov. 17, 1951.

² Kali Beg [Alibek Hakim] and Hamza [Uçar] to John Hall Paxton, Mar. 13, 1952, John Hall Paxton Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT; John Stanwell-Fletcher, *Pattern of the Tiger* (Boston: Little Brown, 1954), 138.

³ Milton J. Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom: Decimated by Chinese Reds and the Hazards of a Hostile Land, Nomads of the Steppes Trekged 3,000 Miles to Kashmir," *National Geographic Magazine* 106, no. 5 (1954): 629.

dom as the motive for a people's migration to Turkey would be boring and ethnocentric. The issues of these refugees, who were tiny in number, were finally forwarded to Washington, enabling the refugees to emigrate to Turkey. This paper refers to documents and to several contemporary texts that have not been adequately referenced in previous studies to focus on the American aid extended to Kazakh refugees both from the local and diplomatic perspective. By examining the motivations of those who provided the support, the paper elucidates that the Americans viewed the Kazakh refugees as potential "political, psychological and intelligence" resources that could be utilized for covert operations against their communist enemies.

2. Approaches to Kazakh Refugees in Srinagar: Aiding and Politicizing Them and Their Acquisition of American Favors

Florence Percy

The American Embassy in New Delhi was first to pay attention to the Kazakh refugees. However, its approach remained indirect and informal. Florence Percy, the wife of geographic attaché Etzel Percy, unofficially investigated the condition of Kazakh refugees in early November 1951 upon the demand of the Embassy's staff. Percy submitted a brief report to the Embassy at the request of the Tolstoy Foundation in New York.⁴ According to this report, she visited the refugee camp in Serai Safa Kadal, where she saw nomadic tents "somewhat like an igloo." Around 60 widows and 40 children "of those who lost their lives in the fight for personal freedom" were "living and sleeping outside on a verandah." There were around a hundred children of school-going age. "Kazakhs seemed hungry for education," Percy says, "not only for their children, but for themselves." She reported the hopes of an elder leader that America would offer not just monetary help, but also support for education.⁵

In her letter to Hall Paxton, who will be mentioned later, Percy pointed out that "the Kazakhs were eminently deserving of any help that we may be able to give them."⁶ Her investigation must have prompted the New Delhi Embassy to begin helping the Kazakh refugees.

⁴ Tolstoy Foundation had relieved a small refugee group of the Russian Old Believers who had left Xinjiang in 1947 and reached to Calcutta in 1951 by similar way of Kazakh refugees. Scott Moss, *A History of the Tolstoy Foundation 1939–1989*, http://www.tolstoyfoundation.org/pdfs/tf_history_s-moss_.pdf, 18–21 (accessed Nov. 12, 2018).

⁵ Florence Percy to Paxton, Nov. 18, 1951, National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, MD, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

⁶ Ibid.

Donald Ebright

However, the Embassy preferred indirect means of support. In early 1952, a social welfare attaché mentioned the Kazakh refugees to missionary volunteer Donald Ebright, who served as the director of Refugee and Famine Relief for the National Christian Council (NCC) of India (1948–52). The responsibility for relief activities fell on Ebright's shoulders because "this was not a job the American Embassy should undertake."⁷

Perhaps the American Embassy avoided direct aid to Kazakh refugees for reasons that could be asked to Uyghur migrants who had sought asylum in Kashmir prior to Kazakhs since 1950. Their leaders, İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra, met the Ambassador Loy Henderson and expressed their hope for American aid for relief to the refugees and for their organization in February 1950.⁸ Though Henderson was personally sympathetic to these refugees, the Embassy feared that certain Indian officials and the public might resent any indirect US relief to Uyghur refugees because India herself had millions of refugees (Washington shared such concern⁹). He reported that the Indian Government feared being accused of harboring the enemies of communist China, and that the government suspected that the Uyghur refugees may be sympathetic to Pakistan because of their shared religion and that some of the refugees may even act as Pakistan's agents.¹⁰ Thus, the Embassy entrusted relief activities for Kazakh refugees to Ebright.

At first, Ebright contacted Dr. Phillip Edmonds, a director of the British Church Missionary Society School in Srinagar, from which most of the top-ranking Kashmir officials had graduated. Then, the Tolstoy Foundation offered substantial funds to support Xinjiang Kazakh refugees. In February 1952, Ebright opened a bank

⁷ Donald F. Ebright, *Free India: The First Five Years; An Account of the 1947 Riots, Refugees, Relief, and Rehabilitation* (Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1954), 124.

⁸ Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, Feb. 6, 1950, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/2-1650. They kept in touch with the American Embassy until Alptekin migrated to Turkey in 1954. In his memoir, Alptekin recalls that the Embassy's staff members told him that America might go to war against Communist China and asked him whether rebels against China in Xinjiang would help in such an event. Ömer Kul, haz., *İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları: Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2007), 2: 15.

⁹ Department of State to the Embassy, New Delhi, Mar. 17, 1950, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, no number.

¹⁰ Henderson to Acheson, Apr. 15, 1950, NARA RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/4-1550.

account for the relief fund and immediately sent Edmonds in Srinagar the first check.¹¹

The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, supported the aid to the Kazakh refugees. The Kashmir government housed the refugees in two caravanserais, and Sheikh Abdullah appointed a relief committee. Ebright stated that “it was fortunate” for the smooth operations of the relief activity that Sheikh Abdullah “took a personal interest in the refugees and was a personal friend of Dr. Edmonds.”¹²

While engaging in relief activities such as the supply of food, clothing, and medical care, Ebright also sought land to resettle the Kazakh refugees because they did not want to travel any more. The Sind Valley was suggested, but it was already overpopulated. The Revenue Minister mentioned Uri. Ebright prepared to donate to the refugees sheep that they lost on the trail. Cows were also required, so it was suggested the Mennonites or Brethren to start a “heifer for the Himalayas” or “cows for the Kazakhs” campaign.¹³ Ebright left India in 1952, and Donald E. Rugh succeeded his directorship.

Donald Rugh and Phillip Edmonds

Although Ebright was not himself accused, some other foreigners in Kashmir were suspected of furthering a political mission in their dealings with the Kazakh refugees. Rajpori, Kaul, and Kumar, Indian leftists, denounced these people, saying “not only do they collect information... but also encourage pro-Pakistani activities and ideas” and “have done indiscriminate propaganda against the dangers of Communism.”¹⁴ In their eyes, missionaries, anthropologist, the United Nations Military Observers Group (UNMOG), and the U.S. Embassy staff members plotted together, and they were closely associated with Kashmir’s Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah. Kazakh refugees were regarded as being involved in this anti-communist, pro-Pakistani, and “independent Kashmir” oriented circle.¹⁵ It should be added that

¹¹ Ebright, *Free India*, 124–25.

¹² *Ibid.*, 132–33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 133–34.

¹⁴ Ghulam Mohammad Mir Rajpori and Manohar Nath Kaul, *Conspiracy in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Social & Political Study Group, 1954), 27, 30–31.

¹⁵ Accusation towards Kazakh refugees rose up after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, August 1953. Hasan Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1976), 272–73.

Sheikh Abdullah was alleged to have accepted “5,000 Kazakh refugees” from Central Asia (obviously exaggerated) while he neglected or did not allow other non-Muslim refugees from Pakistani Punjab and Kashmir.¹⁶

According to Rajpori and Kaul, Donald Rugh was closely associated with the American Embassy, particularly with the social welfare attaché. It was argued that they had at first decided to settle the Kazakh refugees in Kashmir, but because of the political backgrounds of the refugee leaders, they altered this decision and planned to resettle them in Turkey. USA’s Church World Service liaised with Kashmir and the American Embassy in Turkey. Moreover, Rajpori and Kaul suspected Rugh of some special political “mission” besides the resettlement of Kazakhs.¹⁷

Phillip Edmonds, the principal of the British missionary school in Srinagar, was the most important personality among missionaries in Kashmir. He had lived in Kashmir for more than six years, and had forged close ties with the American Embassy staff, UNMOG officers, the PM Sheikh Abdullah, and his advisers. In short, he “functioned as the chief link between the Americans and Sheikh Abdullah.”¹⁸ Rajpori and Kaul accused Edmonds of utilizing his position as a missionary and educationalist for varied political purposes, including advocacy for an independent Kashmir or the propagation of a pro-Pakistan orientation to Sheikh Abdullah.¹⁹ According to them, “his [Edmonds’] activities had a much wider range than entailed by his normal functions.”²⁰ For example, he was condemned for conducting espionage and other subversive UNMOG activities for Pakistan or against India.²¹

In addition, Edmonds engaged in relief fund and cultural activities with Kazakh refugees. He also integrated them into political life. It was suspected that the major part of the relief fund money sent to him from the Tolstoy Foundation via Ebright and Rugh, “has gone to politically undesirable persons.”²² The following passage in Edmonds’ letter to the *Times* also aroused Kumar’s suspicions about his polit-

¹⁶ Hari Jaisingh, *Kashmir: A Tale of Shame* (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1996), 93–94; Pyarelal Kaul, *Crisis in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Suman Publications, 1991), 67–68; K. N. Pandita, “Demographic Change in Kashmir: The Bitter Truth,” in *Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh: Ringside Views*, ed. Shyam Kaul and Onkar Kachru (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1998), 59.

¹⁷ Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 27, 30–31.

¹⁸ Vijay Kumar, *Anglo-American Plot against Kashmir* (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1954), 202.

¹⁹ Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 28–29.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 29–30; Kumar, *Anglo-American*, 202.

²² Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 30.

ical intentions:

a large number of the Kazakhs, ... elected to stay here [Kashmir] largely because they felt they were nearer their homeland and because they believed they would be more likely to play some part in returning when the time come.²³

It is obvious that America was a hopeful partner for Kazakh refugees in their politicization process. For example, Alibek Hakim told Rugh:

We are sure that the Red tyranny must fall in the fight of all the free nations under the guidance of America upon whom we, the Turkistanis, look, as our sponsor. We are prepared to sacrifice to the last drop of our blood in this struggle. We pray for a better future which will be possible through the democratic countries, especially America.²⁴

Milton Clark

While missionaries functioned significantly in settling and politicizing the refugees, American anthropologist Milton J. Clark influenced the manner in which the rest of the world viewed them. Clark was a doctoral student at Harvard University. When he read a news report of Kazakh refugees having appeared in Kashmir in late 1951, he recognized two opportunities and decided to go to Kashmir to visit with them to study them for his dissertation and to hear first hand, the survivors' narratives of the migration.²⁵

Soon after arriving in Kashmir in August 1952, Clark developed close relationships with the Kazakh and Uyghur refugees and engaged in anthropological investigation and cultural welfare activities, imparting English lessons to the refugees and their children. However, Rajpori and Kaul's suspicious eyes also followed Clark's activities. According to their accusations, Clark effected a comprehensive social and political survey with special reference to the frontier areas linking Kashmir with Central Asia and Tibet. He helped Kazakhs form an organization, preparing their statements and documents, and took Kazakh leaders out of town for more confidential discussions. He met Sheikh Abdullah frequently and they discussed Central

²³ P. A. Edmonds, "Kazakhs on the Move: Building New Life in Kashmir," *The Times*, Apr. 21, 1953.

²⁴ Ebright, *Free India*, 132.

²⁵ Clark, "How the Kazakhs": 622.

Asian politics and American foreign policy. In the US, Clark made important political contacts with Republicans in the Far East lobby and maintained contact with the overseas news editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, who sought information about the situation in Chinese Central Asia.²⁶ In short, Clark was alleged to disguise his political agency as research. Rajpori and Kaul argued that “he was more suave and subtler than Edmonds, and his techniques of work were more upto date.”²⁷

Their claim that Clark took Kazakh refugees to the mountains for filming is plausible.²⁸ Such an allegation can be supported by Alibek’s son Hasan Oraltay and nephew Şirzat Doğru. According to Oraltay and Doğru, Clark stayed among the Kazakhs to learn their language and customs. He had them set up nomadic tents in Sonamarg, a skirt of the Himalaya Mountains, 80 kilometers north-east of Srinagar. There, Clark encouraged the Kazakhs to wear national clothes, perform a kind of wedding ceremony, practice wrestling, dance, and make *kumis*. Kazakh refugees met his requests for the sake of introducing Turkestan and the Kazakh people.²⁹ Thus, Clark reproduced national Kazakh life in Kashmir just like in the Altay villages. Of course, this endeavor was not a form of *dilettantism*. Photographs published in *National Geographic* should be considered as a type of “political show” aiming to display freedom seekers who were able to successfully flee communist dominance and to begin rebuilding their lives in the free world. In a way, the photographs were meant to invoke feelings of sympathy for Kazakhs in the magazine’s readers.

In assuming Clark’s political and intelligence tendencies, it is meaningful that İsa Yusuf Alptekin remembered Clark as an agent of the Office of Strategic Services who landed in Kashmir, in Alptekin’s memory, by parachute. During a visit to New York in 1969, Alptekin also recalled that Clark collected information about Chi-

²⁶ Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 31–32.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁹ Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda*, 272; Şirzat Doğru, *Türkistan’a Doğru: Türkistan, Türkiye, Kazakistan Arasında Anılar, Düşünceler, Bilgi ve Belgeler* (İzmir: Arena Matbaacılık, 2008), 157.

na.³⁰ Moreover, Clark's name appears again in the late 1950's as the chief of the CIA station in Vientiane.³¹

In any case, Rugh, Edmonds, and Clark engaged in relief and social welfare activities for Kazakh refugees in Kashmir in 1952 and 1953. The American ambassador in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, expressed his confidence in the ability and integrity of these three individuals in his letter to Alibek. He also suggested that practical measures should be taken in the interests of all concerned through representatives of the Kazakhs and of the Kashmir government and through these three people.³² In short, Rugh, Edmonds, and Clark functioned as the informal channels of the American Embassy.

Adlai Stevenson

Another obvious political show was effected by Clark and Edmonds when Adlai Stevenson, a presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, visited a Kazakh refugee camp. Stevenson went on a world tour the year following his loss to Eisenhower in the 1952 election. He arrived in Srinagar on May 1, 1953 and met Sheikh Abdullah three times. Rajpori and Kaul insist that Stevenson evinced keen interest in the Kashmir problem, and emphasized direct talks between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers while considering the wishes of local inhabitants. Rajpori and Kaul claim that leaning toward Sheikh Abdullah, Stevenson agreed with the independent Kashmir solution.³³

Thus, Stevenson's visit to the Kazakh refugees may be evaluated as an ex-

³⁰ Reha Oğuz Türkkan, "İsa Yusuf Bek Öldü mü? İssız Acun Kaldı mı?," *Doğu Türkistan'ın Sesi*, sy. 47 (1996): 5. Türkkan, a well-known Turkish nationalist who taught at Columbia University at that time, didn't take Alptekin's words seriously at first because he had been familiar with Clark. Immediately, Türkkan called Clark on the telephone, asked him "Let's see now, whose voice is the voice of who will speak now?" Milton Clark quickly guessed Alptekin correctly.

³¹ William J. Rust, *Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954-1961* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 59-60.

³² Chester Bowles to Alibek, Nov. 20, 1952, Hasan Oraltay Private Archive, National Academic Library of Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Folder 14/14, 28.

³³ Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 56-58. However, it would be difficult to take their suspicious eyes at value. During lunch with Stevenson, Sheikh Abdullah expressed he wanted out both India and Pakistan from Kashmir. "He was attacked in India as a Moslem and in Pakistan as a stooge of the Hindus." Moreover, he was also impatient with the UN because its guarantees were worthless without a force. John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), 54.



Fig. 1: Stevenson's Visit to Serai Safa Kadal³⁴

tension of the US diplomacy on Kashmir and of Sheikh Abdullah's affiliation with America as evidenced by his close association with Edmonds and Clark as mentioned earlier. Stevenson entered into a private discussion with Edmonds and Clark, who took him to a Kazakh refugee camp in Serai Safa Kadal on May 2.³⁵

On this visit, Stevenson noted:

Girls in ancient costume sang their folk songs while we sat on rugs surrounded by headman of Tribe. Pure Turks. Speak Turkish. Origin of Turks. [...] Chief made fine speech of appreciate on for my visit; for refuge of Indian govt; for [those]... who died on the way. I responded – U.S. admires a people who value freedom more than life. Applause.³⁶

The Associated Press (AP) forwarded Stevenson's description of Kazakh refugees as

³⁴ "Türkistan'dan Haberler," *Türkistan*, sy. 3-4 (1953), 47.

³⁵ Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 28, 32, 57.

³⁶ Martin, *Adlai Stevenson*, 54.

freedom seekers as follows:

The American people deeply appreciate the heroism and courage of the Kazaks in their arduous trek from their homeland across the snow-capped peaks and valleys of the Himalayas to the safety and freedom of Kashmir.

Thus, Stevenson recognized them as people “who love freedom more than the comforts of life” and said that such people deserved “great respect.”³⁷

The next day, Kazakh delegates returned Stevenson’s call. “*They had no friends but America,*” Stevenson notes, “Indians didn’t want them; didn’t want to go to Turkey, wanted to go home. Many of their people wanted escape but India wouldn’t let them in.”³⁸ Though their numbers were very small, Kazakh refugees were no longer insignificant. Although Şirzat Doğru was absent at that point, he told the author of this paper that they wanted to appeal to their existence as anti-communists in Srinagar.³⁹ It may be asserted that a political show was arranged by Clark and Edmonds provided Kazakh refugees with the favor of a highly important American political figure who confirmed their status as freedom seekers.

3. Hall Paxton: Attempt to Include Xinjiang Refugees

“Not Forgetting You,” Uyghur Refugees

Others outside Kashmir also paid attention to the Kazakh refugees. Jacobs argues that Yolbars Khan in Taipei and Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra in Istanbul competed between themselves to attract the Xinjiang refugees to their sides.⁴⁰ Apart from this, the refugees in Srinagar also maintained contact with American diplomat John Hall Paxton of Isfahan. In fact, Paxton’s attribution brought the Kazakh refugee problem to Washington’s attention.

Since 1946, Paxton had served as consul to Urumqi, which was called Dihua at that time. He abandoned the consulate in August 1949 as the People’s Liberation Army approached Xinjiang. His party reached New Delhi after detouring the Taklamakan Desert and crossing over the Karakoram Pass.⁴¹ After spending a year in

³⁷ *The Boston Globe*, May 3, 1953.

³⁸ Martin, *Adlai Stevenson*, 54.

³⁹ Şirzat Doğru, interview by author, Kemalpaşa, Izmir, Aug. 2013.

⁴⁰ Justin M. Jacobs, *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), 207–10. See also Chapter 5 in this book.

⁴¹ Peter Lisagor and Marguerite Higgins, *Overtime in Heaven: Adventures in the Foreign Ser-*

America, Paxton was appointed consul in Isfahan. He corresponded with leading Kazakh refugees such as Delilhan Canaltay, Alibek Hakim, and Hüseyin Teyci between January and April of 1952, two months before his sudden death.⁴²

It would be useful at this juncture to focus on the Uyghur refugees who reached Kashmir earlier than the Kazakhs. In brief, the correspondence between Paxton and the Uyghurs paved the way for the relief for Kazakh refugees. For example, Enver Şahkul of the US embassy in Ankara had served in the consulate of Urumqi and had escaped to India as a member of Paxton's party. He was Paxton's informant since December 1949. He forwarded to Paxton, in Washington, and later in Isfahan, the Xinjiang news and the circumstances of the Uyghur refugees in India. These refugees could listen to the short-wave radio messages from Urumqi.⁴³ Paxton always welcomed Şahkul's reports concerning his "Yurt (homeland)."⁴⁴ Thus, Paxton grasped that Alibek and Canaltay were among the 300 Kazakh refugees in Srinagar, that they had applied to Saudi Arabia for settlement but had been turned down, and that they were subsequently asking Turkey for asylum.⁴⁵

Paxton kept in touch with İsa Yusuf Alptekin, and also with the other refugees in Srinagar. Some of them had been students of Paxton's wife Vincoe, who had taught English in Urumqi.⁴⁶ They appealed to Paxton in grievous voices. It should be noted at this point that some refugees hoped to receive education, even advanced medical training, in the US for serving their homeland. They had asked Paxton to mediate on their behalf in Washington⁴⁷ through their organization, which was called

vice (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 173–206.

⁴² Among these correspondences, Jacobs refers to following themes: a) Being killed of Douglas Mackiernan whom Hüseyin Teyci had treated in Gasköl; b) Delilhan Canaltay's consultation on whether he should accept Kuomintang's invitation to Taiwan; c) \$300 personal check from Paxton for Kazakh refugees, which was divided equally among them. Jacobs, *Xinjiang*, 200–1, 209.

⁴³ Enver Şahkul to Paxton, Dec. 5, 1949; Jan. 26, 1950; Mar. 13, 1950; Apr. 14, 1950; May 16, 1950; Aug. 5, 1950; Sep. 5, 1950; Nov. 9, 1951; Mar. 11, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 2–4, 7, 9–11, 14–17, 24–25; Şahkul to Bertel E. Kuniholm, Mar. 21, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 110, 35; Şahkul to Kuniholm, Apr. 9, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 22.

⁴⁴ Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 5, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 110, 34; Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 30, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 114, 20.

⁴⁵ Şahkul to Paxton, Nov. 15, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 32.

⁴⁶ Murat Alptekin to Paxton, Mar. 30, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6 Folder 115, 39; Lisagor and Higgins, *Overtime*, 185.

⁴⁷ Muharrem Kari to Paxton, Jun. 10, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 120, 13; Abdurrauf

the Turkistan Refugee Committee and was located in Serai Safa Kadal.⁴⁸ In fact, the committee's president Ubaydullah (spelled as Abaidullah) reported that around 125 refugees led by Hüseyin Teyici and Sultan Şerif arrived in Srinagar and stayed in the same serai, and that more 200 refugees in Ladakh were waiting for their Indian visas and for permission to enter Indian territory.⁴⁹

Along with the other problems of the refugees, İsa Yusuf Alptekin engaged with the issue of education. He asked Paxton to mediate with Washington on their behalf for their youth to study in the US. "The Chinese Government did neither open any educational institutes in our country," he alleged, "and nor allowed our boys and students to proceed to other countries for such purposes." He saw the flight from Xinjiang as "an opportunity for them [Turkestani youths] to get some education." The loss of this opportunity due to the lack of finances signified "a great injustice with them." In addition, Alptekin cleverly calculated that "America will also be benefitted" if these students were to obtain their education in the US. He attached a list of 11 candidates aged 13 to 25 years.⁵⁰

Paxton, who was "still hoping that something more can be done for our friends" and "working on it several angles,"⁵¹ had devoted himself to engaging with the Americans on this issue. As of May 1951, however, he had found no solution.⁵² Dawud Rashid,⁵³ who had joined Paxton's party to flee Xinjiang and was one of the above mentioned candidate students, fell into great disappointment not having heard from the American government. Ashamed of the parasitic life given to him by Alptekin in Srinagar, Rashid appealed to Paxton to help him obtain some work. "We have many hopes in America," he wrote, "I have many hopes in you and am sure that you would not forget me."⁵⁴

Kanat to Paxton, Jun. 17, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 126, 5; Ahmed Halimi and Polat Qadiri [Turfani] to Paxton, Jun. 29, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 42; Settar Makbul to Paxton, Jun. 25, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 25.

⁴⁸ Halimi and Qadiri to Paxton, Jun. 29, 1950; Jul. 24, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 42-43; Abaidullah [Ubaydullah] to Paxton, Apr. 12, 1951; Apr. 18, 1951; Oct. 8, 1951; Jan. 28, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 48-50, 52-54.

⁴⁹ Ubaydullah to Paxton, Oct. 8, 1951.

⁵⁰ İsa Yusuf Alptekin to Paxton, Jun. 1, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 115, 11, 13-14.

⁵¹ Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 3, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 104, 13.

⁵² Paxton to İsa Yusuf Alptekin, May 4, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 111, 1.

⁵³ Lisagor and Higgins, *Overtime*, 184.

⁵⁴ Dawud Rashid [David Rashid Osman] to Paxton, Jan. 30, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 126, 2.

Paxton desired to avoid the refugees feeling disappointment toward America. In his reply, Paxton calmed Dawud's anxiety and wrote that he could not forget Dawud and their escape from Xinjiang, and that he was still pursuing the matter of the scholarship. He hoped to discuss with Alptekin "all possibilities for education in the United States for you and other young people from "Yurt"."⁵⁵

Needless to say, the most obvious sign of "not forgetting you" toward the refugees was donation. Paxton sent the US embassy in New Delhi a check for 300 dollars.⁵⁶ Ubaydullah, the president of the Turkistan Refugee Committee, thanked Paxton and the embassy staff member Douglas Forman for their donation of around 1,450 rupees. However, the amount did not matter to him. Instead, "it shows how your goodself still remember us," Ubaydullah referred to Paxton's remembrance, "and it is really a matter of great pleasure for all of us that we have a friend like you and who remembers us in our present hour of plight." According to him, the refugees could also never forget that Paxton had not forgotten them, and that he had extended and increased his help toward them.⁵⁷

The exchanges that Paxton maintained with the Uyghur refugees were prior to and parallel with his correspondence with the Kazakhs. Such communications evidence that Paxton's sympathy and devotion to the Kazakh refugees, expressed in the form of the arrangement of scholarships and donation, was inherited from his feelings for the Uyghurs.

Subsequent "Not Forgetting You," Kazakh Refugees

On the other hand, the correspondence between Paxton and the Kazakh refugees, especially Delilhan Canaltay in Srinagar, began in November 1951.⁵⁸ These letters symbolize the politicization of the Kazakh refugees.

In his first letter to Paxton, Canaltay asked him to come to the *serai*, to witness their miserable conditions, and to help him and the Kazakh party. Like the Uy-

⁵⁵ Paxton to Rashid, Feb. 18, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 35.

⁵⁶ Clare H. Timberlake to Paxton, Apr. 5, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 11.

⁵⁷ Ubaydullah to Paxton, Apr. 18, 1951; Apr. 29, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 49–50.

⁵⁸ Kazakh leaders such as Alibek Hakim and Hüseyin Teyci, who stayed in the Gasköl region, dispatched letters to Alptekin and Buğra in spring of 1951. Alptekin and Buğra started acting for the Kazakhs after they received those letters. They requested Ambassador Henderson and the Indian government to approach the Tibetan government. After Kazakh refugees fled to the Indian border of Ladakh, Buğra attempted to obtain permissions for them to enter India (Alptekin had gone to Saudi Arabia). Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 20–29, 44–45, 53–54.

ghur refugees mentioned above, Canaltay's message must have appealed to Paxton for mercy: "Whenever I remember your companionship of Uramchi [sic] I burst into tears."⁵⁹

Receiving the letter finally on January 2, 1952, Paxton was "deeply moved." He marveled at Canaltay's perseverance and was delighted to hear from him. Excusing himself for not visiting Srinagar for the time being, Paxton tactfully showed his affection for the Kazakhs as follows: "our continuing interest in the refugees from "yurt" which we have come to consider our own second country" and "never forgetting your loyal friendship to our country and both of us." Paxton encouraged Canaltay not to abandon hope because he had sought aids by all means.⁶⁰

Canaltay asked again Paxton to help Kazakh refugees and to explain their miserable conditions to his American friends for aid. "I too was a chairman of a kingdom [sic]," he claimed as he recounted his misery, "but at present I am a friendless of [sic] helpless refugee." According to him, all the Kazakh refugees in Srinagar and in Ladakh lacked money and friends.⁶¹

Paxton immediately sent the refugees a \$300 check, the same amount he had sent the Uyghurs, and each Kazakh leader including Ubaydullah wrote him a thank-you letter.⁶² On the very same day that he wrote his letter of thanks to Paxton, however, Canaltay wrote another personal missive which may be considered negotiation for his personal profit. Canaltay described his misery, "a head worker of a Nation and a man equal to aking [sic]" fell into "a position not more than a begger [sic]." He requested Paxton to send him some money separately. Further, he expressed his wish to go back to his motherland and asked for Paxton's opinion and help in this regard also.⁶³

When it appeared that Paxton did not agree with Canaltay's proposed return to Xinjiang ("it would seem to imply cooperation with the very people who

⁵⁹ Dalile Khan Haji [Delilhan Canaltay] to Paxton, Nov. 27, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 118, 27.

⁶⁰ Paxton to Canaltay, Jan. 3, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 17.

⁶¹ Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 18, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 119, 53.

⁶² Husayin Tayji [Hüseyin Teyci] to Paxton, Jan. 23, 1952, in *Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 1945–1955* ([Wilmington, DE]: Scholarly Resources, [1989]), microfilm, 18: 589; Ubaydullah to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 54; Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952 in *Records* 18: 587.

⁶³ Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952, in *Records* 18: 588.

drove you out”),⁶⁴ Canaltay apparently changed his mind and expressed the desire to go to the US. He asked Paxton to write to high ranking officers and to send him the requisite expenses, passports, and visas for his family, at least for a future visit. As Jacobs refers, Canaltay asked for Paxton’s opinion about whether or not he should accept Kuomintang’s invitation to go to Taiwan. Moreover, according to Canaltay’s letter, Donald Rugh visited the refugee camp on 27 February, gave out clothes and grains, and told the people about a relief plan to distribute sheep, cows, and cultivation tools in June. Canaltay appreciated Paxton because “It is only you who always informed and impressed your American friend to help us.”⁶⁵

In his last reply to Canaltay, Paxton suggested that he communicate with the Embassy in New Delhi about a visit to Taipei. In response to Canaltay’s wish to visit the US, Paxton merely replied that all he could do was pass on the request to the American authorities. Instead, Paxton proposed a scholarship to study in America as he had arranged for the Uyghur refugees.⁶⁶ However much Paxton showed his sympathies toward Canaltay and the other Kazakh refugees, he could not make rash promises in response to Canaltay’s requests. In fact, Washington did not allow it. In the confidential letters to Ambassador Henderson, Burton Berry, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Near East Affairs, the Department of State expressed its reluctance to accept refugees from Chinese Turkestan to the US. Upon the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act on December 31, 1951, there was “no special legislative authority to deal with the problem of refugees.” Berry referred to the fact that a similar legislation might be enacted during that year, “but with [presidential and congress] elections coming up,” he added, “not much hope can be held out.” In addition, the Chinese immigration quota, under which Turkestani refugees might qualify, was greatly oversubscribed.⁶⁷ In short, Washington reviewed the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees within the legislative frame.

Arranging scholarships for the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees was one of the few options Paxton could find. In fact, such a scholarship plan was later discussed between Alibek Hakim and the American Embassy in New Delhi. According to the

⁶⁴ Paxton to Canaltay, Feb. 11, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 31.

⁶⁵ Canaltay to Paxton, Feb. 29, 1952, in *Records* 18: 596–97.

⁶⁶ Paxton to Canaltay, Mar. 29, 1952, in *Records* 18: 579.

⁶⁷ Burton Y. Berry to Henderson, Feb. 1, 1952, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

Ambassador, Chester Bowles, who succeeded Henderson, Alibek had proposed that four Kazakh students should be allowed to study in the US in addition to the four Uyghur candidates who had already been selected. Bowles replied that these Uyghurs had been offered funds by private American citizens after careful consideration, and that arranging similar scholarships for four Kazakhs would cause considerable difficulties. However, he also suggested the possibility that funds could be obtained for courses higher than preliminary study if there were some applicants who were “considered to have adequate educational background and command of English to enable them to benefit by education in the United States.”⁶⁸

According to William Anderson, a staff member of the Office of Chinese Affairs (CA), Department of State, who wrote some confidential memoranda in this regard, the CA took the responsibility for the case of one Uyghur student and it was agreed “in recent conversations with S/P [Policy Planning Staff] and CIA” that the CA would mediate with Georgetown University and the US embassy in New Delhi. It is worth noting that Anderson believed that the details of the financial sponsorship program would not be communicated to the embassy, and that the CA assumed that in this process a channel for helping or utilizing selected persons from Central Asia may be developed through the Committee for Free Asia, which founded the Radio Free Asia in 1951.⁶⁹ Along with the Uyghur students, the CA also continued to function “as the primary action office in developing plans for assisting or utilizing selected Kazakhs of Sinkiang origin” with the consent of the functionaries of the Office of South Asian Affairs.⁷⁰

Investment on Refugees

Although Alibek appeared to have failed to confirm scholarships for the Kazakh youth, it is very meaningful that “assisting” some Kazakh refugees was the reverse side of “utilizing” them. From the beginning, Paxton clearly stated his motivations for helping the refugees in several of his communications. In his letter to Canaltay, Paxton explained the reason for offering American aid as follows: “it chiefly due to your freedom-loving standards having evoked much American interest and the

⁶⁸ Bowles to Alibek. Nov. 20, 1952, Hasan Oraltay Private Archive, Folder 14/14, 28.

⁶⁹ William O. Anderson, memorandum, Aug. 25, 1952, “Memorandum for File,” in *Records* 27: 270; Anderson to Alfred L. Jenkins, memorandum, Jan. 7, 1953, “Aid for Sinkiang Refugees,” in *Records* 31: 1113.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

activity of the Embassy in New Delhi in presenting your case.”⁷¹ However, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that such humanitarian concerns and impressions, though they themselves could not be denied, also served to disguise America’s pursuing of its own interests.

In January 1952, Ambassador Henderson in Teheran forwarded to the above mentioned Berry a copy of Paxton’s letter addressed to him. In this missive, Paxton emphasized that the importance of “the smallest gesture of aid” to the Uyghur refugees in Kashmir would bring a disproportionate credit to the US. In other words, a tiny “investment” on these refugees would result in high returns, viz. American credit and Russian discredit throughout Muslim Central Asia. In fact, as of March 1950 according to Paxton, the Policy Planning Staff had planned to resettle Uyghur refugees in the US and Paxton would be assigned to assist Alptekin who would arrive by airplane first. Though this plan fell through, Paxton still continued to consider this case seriously, saying “their problems deserve more sympathetic consideration than they have yet been given.” In short, “these people should not be forgotten.” That was why Paxton had been interested in helping the Uyghur refugees and had appealed to Henderson although this issue was far removed from their contemporary missions.⁷²

Similarly, in February 1952 Paxton told Garret Soulen, the consul in Calcutta, the reason why he aided refugee groups who fled from communists. Paxton believed that Americans should respond to the refugees’ adherence to the ideals of liberty:

I feel that people, who have demonstrated so conclusively their adherence to the ideals of liberty that we Americans also hold dear, have already established a claim (though they do not make it themselves) to our moral support, at least.

Subsequently he disclosed his true political aim:

Also I feel that some day we might find it advantageous to have, where they will be available to help us, several of these people who have faced the difficulties of the terrain and are familiar with the customs and dialects of the area.⁷³

In short, Paxton acknowledged the strategic and intelligence value of the

⁷¹ Paxton to Canaltay, Mar. 29, 1952, in *Records* 18: 579.

⁷² For full text, see Appendix 1.

⁷³ Paxton to Garret H. Soulen, Feb. 9, 1952, in *Records* 27: 278.

refugees from Xinjiang along with—or “rather than”—the moral value of helping freedom seekers. Without any doubt, such worth was also applicable to the Kazakh refugees.

In the end, Paxton’s appeals were accepted by high officials in Washington several months after his death in June 1952. The success of this endeavor should be attributed mostly to Henderson, who agreed with Paxton and who reminded Berry of these refugees although, since he was no longer in India, “this problem is not mine.” In his letter, Henderson described the point in symbolically:

The problem of course is in part humanitarian. On the other hand, I am convinced that there is a strong possibility that the funds and time which we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the United States.⁷⁴

4. The Escapee Program: Overt Humanitarian Aid for Covert Aims *Escapee Program and “Phase B”*

With regard to the reception of Uyghur and Kazakh refugees and their resettlement in Turkey within the quota of the 1,850 “Settled Immigrants (İskânlı Göçmen in Turkish)” realized in 1952 through the efforts of İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra, Alptekin indicated the significant preconditions of which the Turkish Government informed them. Immigrants must arrive on the Turkish border on their own expenses and the Turkish government would never sponsor their travel costs.⁷⁵ Turkey opened its doors to the so-called “same origins,” but how did the Xinjiang refugees manage to raise such costs? Almost all of them were living in abject poverty in Srinagar and had asked Paxton for help. Asked this question, Kazakh refugees generally answer, both in published and oral form, that the National Council of Churches (Edmonds and Rugh) and the Red Crescent assisted their transfer from Srinagar to Bombay.⁷⁶ Such a response is not wrong. In reality, these organizations conducted the transfer of the refugees, however, one-sided it was. To answer who really paid their costs and how, researchers must turn to Washington’s arguments in this regard.

The State Department recognized the potential import of the Kazakh refu-

⁷⁴ Henderson to Berry, Jan. 8, 1952, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

⁷⁵ Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 85, 88, 90, 94.

⁷⁶ For example, Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda*, 273–75; Doğru, interview by author.

gees and incorporated them into the Escapee Program. The United States Escapee Program (EP or USEP in short) was created by the Department of State in December 1951 and was approved by President Truman in March 1952. This program aided those who fled communist oppression from behind the Iron Curtain.⁷⁷ EP was a comprehensive relief program that supplied food, provisions, household goods, medical care, and vocational education. It also secured immigration to the third country for refugees or helped migrants with the interrogation and screening procedures and the process of local integration. The EP only operated small staff units in Western Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece, and Turkey to supervise all its projects, which were mainly managed through contracts with interested voluntary agencies. It was reported that as of March 1961, the EP had resettled 143,544 people in third countries and that it had integrated 34,544 people in their first asylum countries since its launch. The assistance offered by this agency aimed to “rebuild hope among refugees,” showing them that they were not forgotten by the free world.⁷⁸

At the same time, however, the EP also purposed to shake Moscow, appealing to the “captive populations behind the Iron Curtain” that America and the free world were “still mindful of their tragic lot and have not forsaken them”⁷⁹ and encouraging further defections from them. It was a kind of “zero-sum game whereby America’s gains represented the Kremlin’s direct losses.”⁸⁰ According to Susan Carruthers, who analyzed the concept of “escapee” and its liminality, the term could be defined as: someone who defected the Eastern bloc including the Soviet Union and its orbiting nations except East Germany, Yugoslavia, and communist China due to

⁷⁷ EP was mainly based on the Section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized expenditure “not to exceed \$100,000,000 of such appropriation for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes.” *Mutual Security Act of 1951*, Public Law 165, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (Oct. 10, 1951).

⁷⁸ Edward W. Lawrence, “The Escapee Program,” *Information Bulletin: Monthly Magazine of the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany*, March 1953: 6–8; Roger W. Jones, “Department Supports Continuation of Refugee and Migration Programs,” *Department of State Bulletin* 45, no. 1157 (1961): 383–84; George L. Warren, “The Escapee Program,” *Journal of International Affairs* 7, no. 1 (1953): 84–85.

⁷⁹ Jones, “Department Supports”: 385.

⁸⁰ Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc “Escapees” and Cold War Borderlands,” *American Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2005): 918.




Fig 2: EP's flowchart⁸¹

political oppression from / disaffection with the communist regime; an escapee was neither an economic immigrant nor an opportunistic non-anticommunist; therefore, escapees had their own dramatic narratives of crossing borders from the East bloc to the West, which could be utilized for propaganda proclaiming the latter's superiority;⁸² escapees were contemporarily accommodated in European camps. In fact, life in the camps was quite wretched and the transfers took a long enough time so that escapees were disappointed⁸³ waiting to be resettled in the West or in other countries of the "free world" to rebuild their hope.⁸⁴ The EP targeted those who were worthy of being an intelligence source and could help in the psychological warfare of the early cold war period, disguising its real interest with its "investment in humanity."⁸⁵ Here, it should be marked that not all kinds of people who left the East

⁸¹ Foreign Operations Administration, *Escape to Freedom* [Washington DC: Foreign Operations Administration, 1954].

⁸² Warren, "The Escapee Program": 83; Carruthers, "Between Camps": 930-32.

⁸³ Carruthers, "Between Camps": 930-32.

⁸⁴ Ibid.: 934.

⁸⁵ Ibid.: 917, 923.

bloc, such as the refugees, displaced persons, economic immigrants, or ordinary military deserters could enjoy the status of “escapee.” The nomenclature was selective, anomalous, and applied to those who were disaffected with the East bloc and deserving of American interest.⁸⁶

Prior to the EP, Truman’s Psychological Strategy Board designed “The Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees,” code-named “Engross,” in December 1951. According to this scheme, the ostensible means for escapees such as employment, resettlement and care were named “Phase A,” which crystalized as the EP within four months. “Phase B,” on the other hand, was targeted at enticing more defectors/escapees and at better utilizing them in covert operations against the Soviet bloc. Such usage included their incorporation into the US military services and into other agencies such as the Voice of America and the CIA.⁸⁷ According to the Operations Coordinating Board’s report on the EP in February 1954, the Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, and the United States Information Agency viewed the EP’s specific benefits as providing:

1. Propaganda material based upon FOA [Foreign Operations Administration]/USEP activities and as provided by individual escapees.
2. Intelligence value information.
3. Candidates for operational programs, both overt and covert.
4. Special service support such as assistance in developing a co-operative attitude in escapees during debriefing and through special handling of disposal cases referred by the operating programs insofar as feasible by an overt apparatus.⁸⁸

EP’s hidden goals such as the above have been partially disclosed in recent years. According to the AP’s investigation conducted in 2007, the American authorities instituted the International Tracing Service, whose task was to go through Nazi documents and to use them to reunite families dispersed during WWII, and to screen

⁸⁶ Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 140; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 918–19, 922–23.

⁸⁷ For the Operation Engross, see Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 78–80; Lucas, *Freedom’s War*, 140–41; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 920.

⁸⁸ Operations Coordinating Board, *Report on the Examination of the Effectiveness of the Escapee Program in Meeting Objectives under NSC 86/1*, Feb. 2, 1954, NARA, RG 59, Box 38, Entry A1 1586C, NND 959007, no number.

EP files on the backgrounds of the escapees for the purpose of recruiting covert US spies.⁸⁹

The EP clearly articulated its political reasons for supporting refugees from communist countries. A memorandum entitled "Escapee Program Submission FY 1954" and revised on October 17, 1952 stated the history of refugee relief in the following manner:

The United States Government has traditionally taken a keen interest in the problems of refugees and escapees, because of the humanitarian considerations involved, as well as the political, economic and psychological significance of these groups.⁹⁰

It is noteworthy that the EP emphasized "political, psychological warfare, and intelligence interests" beyond humanitarianism.⁹¹ Such an emphasis coincides with Paxton's covert intentions with regard to the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees.

The EP identified the importance of refugees in terms such as a) the cooperation of individual refugees and "usefulness of the group as sources of intelligence or as participants in U.S. psychological warfare"; b) the neglect of escapees or their lack of hope would damage the US's psychological warfare efforts against the USSR and its satellite countries; c) the reception, care, and resettlement of the refugees would provide a firm factual basis for the US's psychological programs.⁹² The EP targeted select groups and applied a relatively small amount of money for relief. The application of the EP in these areas would be "directed primarily toward assisting U.S. political, psychological warfare and intelligence programs."⁹³

EP's Application to Kazakh Refugees

Kazakh refugees matched such US interests very well. Memoranda written by two men, both named Edwin Martin, describe the reasoning behind the expansion of the EP to include Kazakh refugees. As previously mentioned, the EP did not in-

⁸⁹ However, it failed to reach outstanding results. Arthur Max and Randy Herschaft, "Archive Catalogs Use of Cold War Refugees: 'Escapee Program' Covert Side Was Recruiting Spies," *SFGate*, Jan. 4, 2009, <https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Archive-catalogs-use-of-Cold-War-refugees-3255775.php> (accessed Nov. 13, 2018); DW Staff, "US Cold War Resettlement Program Used for Propaganda, Spying," *DW*, Dec. 29, 2008, <http://p.dw.com/p/GOKK> (accessed Nov. 13, 2018).

⁹⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Escapee Program Submission FY 1954," in *Records* 27: 225.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*: 227.

⁹² *Ibid.*: 228–29.

⁹³ *Ibid.*: 230.

clude refugees from communist China at its inception. The first Martin, Edwin W. Martin of CA, wrote his colleague on October 27, 1952. Martin learned that the Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNA/R), had approached CA to extend the EP which had been limited to Europe into refugees in Hong Kong, South Asia, and the Near East. CA had also previously recommended such an expansion. According to Martin, CA felt that to continue the EP agenda in Europe while “neglecting Asia would be an untenable proposition,” and that there was an “important political and psychological advantages to be gained” in adopting the EP’s program in Asian areas. Further, the UNA/R was attempting to get approval from the Director of Mutual Security (DMS) for an immediate assistance project for around 300 Xinjiang refugees in Kashmir, namely the Kazakhs.⁹⁴

On the same day that the first Martin wrote his memorandum, the second Martin, Edwin M. Martin, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, wrote to John Ohly in DMS. This message represented the views of the Department of State with regard to a proposal to assist Kazakh refugees. At first, Martin indicated that “It is anticipated that this project [EP] will serve to advance United States national psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives.” He continued, “it is believed that assistance to this group of Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir is in the interests of the United States and, apart from purely humanitarian reasons, will have beneficial political effects.”

Paxton’s devotion to arousing the interest of high officials in the Kazakh refugees can be seen in Edwin’s quotation from Loy Henderson, which has already been quoted above: “we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the U.S.” In short, Paxton’s efforts finally reached one of the highest officials in the Department of State. These phrases also remind us of Paxton’s intention as expressed in his letter to Soulen as previously mentioned.

What do “invest” and “return” mean here? Edwin M. Martin distinguished the Kazakhs from refugees in Europe, whom the EP should resettle in some third country due to over-population and local unemployment in Europe. On the contrary, Martin considered it possible to push for the local (in Kashmir) resettlement or integration of refugees “who prefer to remain close to their homeland.” Local resettlement could be relatively low cost. He estimated that 147 refugees could be settled in

⁹⁴ Edwin W. Martin to Walter P. McConaughy, memorandum, Oct. 27, 1952, “Developments in Escapee Program,” in *Records* 27: 223.

Departure in	Eminent immigrant	Immigrants to Turkey	Total	Remainders in Kashmir
Aug. 1952	Hüseyin Teyci	102	102	230
Nov. 1952	Ömer Çobanoğlu (Alibek's group)	78	180	152
Jan. 1953	Enver Koçyiğit (son of Sultan Şerif)	20 families	-	-
Oct. 1953	-	-	253	97
till Nov. 1953	?	18	271	70
till Mar. 1954	Sultan Şerif	32	303	65
Jun. 1954	Alibek Hakim	59	362	6 (the Canaltays)

Table 1: Process of Kazakh refugees' resettlement from Kashmir to Turkey⁹⁵

Kashmir for \$11,000 USD while \$9,000 would be needed to establish the 153 refugees who had transited to Turkey, i.e., Hüseyin Teyci and the group that left Srinagar in October 1952. For this group, in fact, the above mentioned memorandum "Escapee Program Submission FY 1954" mentioned covering the deficit in their transportation cost.⁹⁶ Per capita, the cost of the former option would be \$75, and the latter would require \$59. Martin concluded that "In Kashmir, local resettlement is a feasible and inexpensive alternative, consistent with the wishes of many of the group." With respect to the urban resettlement of 68 Uyghurs (Turki), he entrusted a voluntary agency for small loans for business, trading and crafting, the refund of which "would be applied to further work among Central Asian refugees."⁹⁷

Such different aid resolutions depending on the group are mentioned in the above mentioned EP memorandum. This note recommended a combined migration: a local resettlement project for Xinjiang refugees as an "illustrative project for the Es-

⁹⁵ Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1953), 744; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1954: Hearings on H.R. 1449*, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1954, 914, 925; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1954, S. Rep. 1979 reprinted in *United States Code Congressional and Administrative News*, 83rd Congress, Second Session (St. Paul, MN: West, 1954), 2: 3232; Erkin Alptekin, *Doğu Türkistan'dan Hicretimizin 40. Yılı* (Kayseri: Erciyes Dergisi Doğu Türkistan Yayınları, 1990), 20, 30–36.

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State, "Escapee Program," in *Records* 27: 253.

⁹⁷ For full text, see Appendix 2.

capee Program for the Near East and South Asia, subject to continuing study and development, and to prior determination that such projects will provide maximum support for political, psychological and intelligence activities in Central Asia, both overt and covert.”⁹⁸

Martin’s resettlement plans were not realized. According to several data sources including the hearings before the committee of the House of Representatives and report of the Senate committee, the group that was expected to settle in rural Kashmir also gradually migrated to Turkey. As previously mentioned, the National Council of Churches was charged with transferring the Kazakh refugees from Srinagar to Bombay, and its headquarters at the World Council of Churches was also contracted with the EP.⁹⁹ Finally, in June 1954, Alibek and the last group of Kazakh refugees departed, and only Canaltay’s family remained in Kashmir.

Wedge into Soviet Russia

Nevertheless, Edwin M. Martin’s aim of utilizing the Kazakh refugees as “political, psychological and intelligence” agents can be noted in the memories of Mansur Teyci, Hüseyin’s son. He recalled his childhood in Kashmir as follows:

One day, my father, Alibek, Canaltay, and Sultan Şerif were invited to the house of a person connected to Indian intelligent service. My father took me there. I remember well there was a bicycle which I had never seen in Eastern Turkestan. After years I learned that they offered to supply efficient foods, clothes, house etc. if Kazakhs present them their youths. Indians intended to send these Kazakhs back to China wearing nomad clothes and to engage them in intelligence activity. This was an attractive offer. But my father refused perhaps for his naive character and I was sole son of him. The others showed interest, but due to my father’s refuse, this offer did not realize.

Later Canaltay served in Indian intelligence service.¹⁰⁰

The exact reason why Kazakh refugees who had desired to remain in Kash-

⁹⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Escapee Program,” in *Records* 27: 253–54.

⁹⁹ U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, *Escape*, 21. Besides the World Council of Churches, the Tolstoy Foundation and Church World Service also attended to the EP.

¹⁰⁰ Mansur Teyci, interview by author, Istanbul, Sep. 2013.

mir, like Alibek's group, decided to migrate Turkey is still unclear.¹⁰¹ Of course, Turkish citizenship must have been attractive to them, but this reason is still insufficient in explaining why the refugees surrendered their hopes of remaining in Kashmir, which was close to their homeland, and which matched the second Edwin Martin's expectations.

Because of this move, Washington could not accomplish the EP's hidden aim, or initiate "Phase B" of utilizing Kazakh refugees for "political, psychological and intelligence" purposes in Kashmir as divulged by Mansur's statement. However, it was very possible that some other refugees who had left Xinjiang in 1934 and had remained in Pakistan were recruited by the CIA for covert operations in Xinjiang. In his memoir, the former Chief Justice of Azad Kashmir High Court, Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, recorded the entrance of the Kazakh refugees into Kashmir. Years later, they dispersed through the northern parts of British India and in 1950–51, there existed a large number of Kazakh refugees in Jhelum, a city of Pakistani Punjab.¹⁰² After Pakistan entered the Baghdad Pact in 1955, these refugees disappeared and Saraf describes their news in the following manner:

after we had entered into the American-sponsored Military alliances, they [Kazakh refugees in Jhelum] suddenly disappeared from the town and rumours have been current persistently that they were picked up by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, smuggled out of Pakistan and after training, at least some of them were smuggled into the Soviet Union for spying. In December, 1973, this writer [Saraf] met two Kazak shop-keepers in Mecca who had been among these refugees. They confirmed that some had "gone" back to Soviet Russia.¹⁰³

Of course, this report was merely based on hearsay and the refugees in Jhelum may have emigrated to Turkey or may have returned to Xinjiang of their own free will. The same applies to escapees in Western camps, who were disillusioned with the West and "found the "free world" less than hospitable" and who re-

¹⁰¹ Doğru told the author just Turkish Government suddenly gave them visas. Doğru, interview by author.

¹⁰² Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight-for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977), 1: 572–73.

¹⁰³ Ibid.: 572.

defected to the East in the mid-1950's.¹⁰⁴ 221 of the 798 Uyghurs who fled Xinjiang with Alptekin and who reached Ladakh returned to Xinjiang because of lack of finances and other reasons. Subsequently, 45 refugees returned to Xinjiang from Srinagar. More than 100 refugees also returned to Xinjiang from a pilgrimage to Mecca because of financial reasons and because of the false rumor of improved conditions in their homeland.¹⁰⁵

Thus, it was quite natural that refugees returned to Xinjiang because of the difficulties and disillusionments they encountered in their first asylum country. The more refugees re-defected, the better suited they were for covert operations. The dissatisfaction of the re-defectors with the "free world" could have been also exploited to mask their intelligence and psychological warfare roles for "Phase B."

It may be pertinent at this juncture to recall the instance of Soviet counter-intelligence against the Turkestan National Union, the outstanding anti-Soviet organization of Western Turkestani émigrés in Western Europe and Middle East. In 1931, an exile from Tashkent named Bahrom Ibrohimov wrote Mufti Sadriddin Xon, the representative of the Union's Mashhad branch. He claimed to be a writer who was in a relationship with a secret organization, and who had escaped from Turkestan fearing arrest. Sadriddin Xon verified Ibrohimov's statement as accurate and forwarded it to the Union's headquarters. Thus, Ibrohimov penetrated the Union and subsequently adopted the new name Mahmud Oyqorli. He worked as Sadriddin Xon's secretary in Afghanistan. However, Oyqorli, whose real identity was GPU agent, took over the Union's Kabul branch and eliminated his boss Sadriddin Xon in 1935. He managed the Union's operations encompassing Iran, Afghanistan, North India, and Xinjiang under the supervision of Soviet spy networks for 24 years. Some of the former anti-Bolshevik guerrillas fell to Oyqorli's death traps. It was only after 1954 when Oyqorli returned to the Soviet Union that his identity was fully exposed.¹⁰⁶ Why then, would Washington not conceive of sending Xinjiang refugees back home to infiltrate their native country under the guise of being disillusioned with Pakistan/India or the "free world" as re-defectors? Why would the US, at the very least, not assist these refugees and keep them close to the Sino-Indian borderland in the name of local integration?

¹⁰⁴ Carruthers, "Between Camps": 934-35.

¹⁰⁵ İsa Yusuf Alptekin to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 115, 19-20.

¹⁰⁶ A. Ahat Andican, *Turkestan Struggle Abroad: from Jadidism to Independence* (Haarlem: SO-TA, 2007), 361-62, 364, 370-80, 445, 545-48, 601-5.

Returning to Saraf's testimony, it is noteworthy that the Kazakh shopkeepers affirmed that some refugees had returned to Soviet Russia, not to China's Xinjiang. Similarly, Donald Ebright of the NCC of India also observed Russia's advance into Xinjiang, writing that "Russia needs Central Asia's resources for her global conquest!"¹⁰⁷ It may hence be said that Kazakh refugees tended to be regarded as fleeing from Soviet Russia.¹⁰⁸

A travel journal written by American naturalist and explorer John Stanwell-Fletcher provides interesting narrative of Kazakh refugees in this context. While traveling through Kashmir, John heard by chance of the refugees led by "Hassantaj" and Sultan Şerif in Kargil before they entered in Srinagar. "Hassantaj" willingly accepted John's offer of an interview. According to "Hassantaj," he had originally lived in eastern Kazakhstan and had been a leader of the first 25 Kazakh men, women, and children who had openly resisted communist policies. They were forced to flee to Urumqi, and were soon driven out from that location by the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs of USSR) security troops to Barköl. There, they were joined by another Kazakh group led by Sultan Şerif and months later they began to flee toward the Taklamakan Deserts, the Tibet mountains, and finally reached India. "All of the first twenty-five," "Hassantaj" said smiling briefly, "who had fled with me from Kazakhstan were with me still."¹⁰⁹

In fact, there was no Hasan Teyci among prominent refugee leaders. This term must be a misspelling of the name Hüseyin Teyci (Qūsayīn Täyzhī), whose background was wholly different from the above narrative. Hüseyin was born in Saertuohai (Sartohay), Qinggil, in north Xinjiang in 1900 and left Barköl in 1938 as a result of Sheng Shicai's purge. The Kazakhs led by Hüseyin settled in the mountains in southern Suzhou. As a result of armed clashes with Ma Bufang's army in 1940, however, they wandered to southeast Xinjiang (Ruoqiang) and west Qinghai (Wutumeiren). After 1943, Hüseyin Teyci's group moved to Gasköl in northwest Qinghai close to Xinjiang. After this transition, Hüseyin worked to increase his livestock, and sheltered other defectors from Xinjiang such as Alibek Hakim, Yolbars Khan, and Douglas Mackiernan.¹¹⁰ When Osman Batur was defeated and the Peo-

¹⁰⁷ Ebright, *Free India*, 135–36.

¹⁰⁸ As to the Soviet factor on Kazakh migration, see Chapter 3 in this book.

¹⁰⁹ Stanwell-Fletcher, *Pattern*, 127–35.

¹¹⁰ For Mackiernan and his follower Frank Bessac's stay in Timurlik of the Gasköl region, see Godfrey Lias, *Kazak Exodus* (London: Evans Brothers, 1956), 170–72; Thomas Laird, *Into*

ple's Liberation Army advanced to Huahaizi in March 1951, Hüseyin Teyci, Delilhan Canlatay, and Sultan Şerif's groups decided to flee to India via Tibet.¹¹¹

In short, it is difficult to regard Hüseyin Teyci as resistant to Soviet policies. Hence, his narrative was just a means of arousing John's pity.¹¹² Hüseyin Teyci knew very well how to frame people who fled Xinjiang, not from Soviet Kazakhstan as "freedom seekers" who would be ideal for America's "zero-sum game" to display its superiority against the Soviet Union. The adoption of Kazakh refugees to the expanded EP was not a passing whim for Washington. Assisting them was expected to drive a wedge not only into communist China, but also into the Soviet Union's eastern front while the original EP targeted the escapees from the Iron Curtain. As Paxton wrote to Henderson, they were eligible for "investment."

5. Conclusion

This paper focused on the various forms of American aid extended to the Kazakh refugees in Kashmir from the local agencies to the highest political echelons of Washington. In the early stages of this support, missionary organizations and an anthropologist politicized the Kazakh refugees parallel to the humanitarian assistance. Apart from their humanitarian motives, the Americans also found a way to fit the refugees into their strategy against the communists. Such approaches were made under the guise of relief. In particular, the role played by Hall Paxton was crucial from the viewpoint of encompassing them within the "not forgetting you" affect. He struggled to maintain the refugees' favorable attitude toward America and in doing so (donation, arrangement of scholarship, etc.), he sublimated the poor Kazakh refu-

Tibet: The CIA's First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa (New York: Grove Press, 2002), 127, 146–53; Frank Bagnall Bessac, Susanne Leppmann Bessac and Joan Orielle Bessac Steelquist, *Death on the Chang Tang: Tibet 1950; The Education of an Anthropologist* (Missoula, MT: University of Montana Printing & Graphic Services, 2006), 71–82; Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda*, 216–18. Before his departure, Mackiernan tore a five-dollar bill into two pieces and placed his and Alibek's thumbprints on each portion. Mackiernan gave one to Alibek and told him to show it to a certain American official in Delhi. However, Mansur Teyci questioned this famous episode and alleged that Alibek tore the bill after arriving in Kashmir. Teyci, interview by author.

¹¹¹ Ömer Kul ve Emin Kırkıl, "Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri Liderlerinden Bir Portre: Hüseyin Teyci Alkenbayoğlu (1900–20 Eylül 1963)," *Trakya Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 1, sy. 2 (2011): 107–11, 113, 122; Haruhira Abe, "Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku," *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 56, no. 1 (2002): 23–24, 29–32.

¹¹² Mansur Teyci also laughed off his father's narrative. Teyci, interview by author.

gees into recipients of America's "investment" or to the position of hopeful candidates of the US's covert "Phase B" operations. Kazakh refugees also repeatedly expressed their ties with Paxton and America. From Washington's perspective, it was difficult to accept these refugees into America. Here the EP emerged to fulfill not only overt aid to them in humanitarian concern, but also covert aims to utilize them for America's own strategic interest. Though the EP offered two options for refugees, migration to a third country or local integration, the latter was apparently more desirable for the Kazakh refugees and for the sake of American interests.

If only the results are considered, the Americans could not sufficiently utilize the Kazakh refugees within the EP framework. Almost all of the Kazakh refugees left Kashmir, so the EP merely ended up covering their migration expenses and failed to retain them in Kashmir as hopeful candidates for "Phase B." Further, soon after they settled in Turkey, conflicts emerged between some Kazakh migrants and the Uyghur refugees headed by Alptekin, and even between groups of Kazakhs. In December 1955, CA pointed out that "Turkey has already had some difficulty owing to factionalism within the groups settled in Turkey."¹¹³

Nevertheless, American involvement in the Kazakh refugee problem, and with political refugees from Central Eurasia in general, would take a new, more statistical shape in the form of Radio Liberty in Munich. Previous studies on this anti-communist broadcasting service have not paid requisite attention to its recruiting of young refugees or the children of other Turkic-origin diasporas such as Hasan Oral-tay or Ali Akış who were active in the Idil-Ural Movement of Volga Tatars, and Settar Makbul Çoban, whom Alptekin listed as a candidate to study in America and who did so.¹¹⁴ Some employees of Turkic origin were transferred to academic careers in the post-Soviet years and are still engaged. This overlap between the extension of "Phase B" and the national struggles of Turkic émigrés and refugees overseas needs more cautious investigation.

Today, the core generation that experienced the Kazakh "exodus" has almost passed away and the second generation born in Turkey is also aging. The fact that Kazakh refugees in Kashmir had attracted the attention and aid of missionaries, anthropologist, diplomats, high-level politicians, and overt—but well calculated—

¹¹³ Douglas Forman to Kendrick, memorandum, Dec. 9, 1955, "Proposed Trip by Representative of Yolbars Khan to Visit Sinkiang Refugees in Various Foreign Countries," in *Records* 19: 67.

¹¹⁴ Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 16.

kindness has already fallen into oblivion. It is almost forgotten that this small, marginalized group of people had been deemed to be vested with a peculiarity that was worth receiving the EP investment for “psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives,” namely “Phase B.” In this sense, the migration of the Kazakh refugees to Turkey was accomplished as the very product of the early cold war period.

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Appendix

1. *J. Hall Paxton's Letter to Loy Henderson*¹¹⁵

American Consulate
Isfahan, Iran
November 14, 1951

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you perhaps already know, I have been much interested in helping the group of Turkis who fled from Sinkiang with Mohammed Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf Aliptekin [sic] and are now dragging out a poor existence in Srinagar.

I have been told that, as soon as their case was presented to you in New Delhi, you called to the Department's attention the importance of not permitting the opportunity to slip for our Government to show an interest in them. Their case is simply this: they are bitterly anti-Communist and have endured tremendous hardships and suffered heavy losses, in both wealth and lives, in their escape over the Karakorum Route from Sinkiang to Ladakh and are now friendless in a strange land.

While it is clear that they do not have the slightest claim on the United States, still it is natural that, in view of the aid given by our country to others who have opposed Soviet Imperialism, they should turn first to us for succor and might hope to receive somewhat more consideration both as a group and as individuals than has yet been shown them by the American Government.

In addition to deserving, at least, moral support from us, I feel it to our national interest to win the disproportionate propaganda credit that would accrue from the smallest gesture of aid to them. This group now seems deserted tiny financial investment (a few thousand dollars in an outright gift to alleviate their misery until something more permanent can be worked out for them, in the way of their resettlement in the New World), this news would reverberate far and wide throughout Muslim Central Asia to our credit and the Russian discredit.

In March 1950, when I was leaving Washington on another assignment, I was told by a member of the Policy Planning Staff that: it had been decided to bring

¹¹⁵ Paxton to Henderson, Nov. 14, 1951, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

the entire party to the United States for permanent residence; funds had been allocated; their place of settlement in America determined; visa requirements arranged for and they all should be arriving by ship at New York within less than four months; Isa Yusuf Aliptekin would be flying in first and, on his arrival, I should be notified and assigned to assist him in planning for the reception of the group. However, since that time, not a word further from my friend in P. – not even an acknowledgement to my letters enquiring about his undertaking.

I have continued to hear from Isa every few months and others of the group from time to time, and there appears to be nothing known to them in prospect, either proximate or long term, for their relief.

Naturally I do not wish to prejudge what should be done for these refugees, but their case has not yet been heard and, in view of the possible wide repercussions that might result from even limited action on our part, it surely deserves a hearing. I have not yet tried to organize the pertinent facts – perhaps it could not be done adequately without a visit to the group now in Kashmir, which seems unlikely for me at present – but I think you will agree that their problems deserve more sympathetic consideration than they have yet been given.

I should appreciate your advice as to the best means of having this matter weighted in executive councils where the problems of these displaced people and our national interest in giving them some aid could really be considered. When we are handing out millions of dollars for, sometimes, weaker causes and so large a portion of our aid to Asia is earmarked for China it seems that these people should not be forgotten.

While Government action is being delayed I would like to explore other resources that might be available for these unfortunates, rejected by both the slave world and the free. I feel confident that some of them would make as good sheepherders as the Basques, whom I hear are being specially imported to fill vacancies in that industry in Wyoming, Montana and Idaho. Might not the Senators from these states and possibly also from Utah, Nevada, Arizona, or New Mexico be interested in Turki oasis-farmers who have had experience in growing crops with little irrigation facilities? What are the channels through which these needs for immigrants can be ascertained?

Another possible source of assistance is suggested in the clipping I enclose

from a recent radio bulletin. Would an appeal to philanthropic groups such as these be advisable?

In the meantime I wish to make another personal contribution and should appreciate your assistance in transmitting it to New Delhi. I am enclosing a personal check made out in your name. I am doing this because a check payable to the "American Embassy, New Delhi" was returned, last year, for substitution of the name of an officer there, as it was inconvenient to take it through the official accounts.¹¹⁶ Would you be so kind as to endorse and mail it to the appropriate person in India for transmission to the "Turkestan Refugee Committee, Srinagar, Kashmir" under whatever safeguards may be appropriate to ensure that it does all the good possible at the best rate of exchange?

Forgive my bothering you with this problem, so remote from our present concerns, but I feel it to be of considerable importance. In view of the reports which have reached me of your personal interest in the plight of these unfortunates, I am encouraged to hope that you may assist me in finding some available way to help these good friends.

Sincerely yours,

J. Hall Paxton

2. *Memorandum on EP's Adaption to Kazakh Refugees*¹¹⁷

MEMORANDUM FOR: John H. Ohly

Office of Director for Mutual Security

SUBJECT: Resettlement of Sinkiang Refugees now in Kashmir

I would like to explain further the views of the Department of State concerning certain aspects of the recent proposal to assist to Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir.

It is anticipated that this project will serve to advance United States national psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives. With respect to the Government of India and local authorities in Kashmir, it is believed that assistance to this group of Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir is in the interests of the United States and,

¹¹⁶ Forman to Paxton, May 21, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 119, 21.

¹¹⁷ Edwin M. Martin to John H. Ohly, memorandum, Oct. 27, 1952, "Settlement of Sinkiang Refugees now in Kashmir," in *Records* 27: 216–18.

apart from purely humanitarian reasons, will have beneficial political effects. The government of India is already heavily burdened with the problem of resettlement of the millions of refugees from Pakistan, and will welcome United States assistance in caring for the needs of this small additional group. This action on the part of the United States will provide concrete demonstration, in a part of India where the Point 4 Program is not operative, of the continuing humane concern of this country for the plight of the oppressed peoples around the world. Ambassador Loy Henderson has recently written the Department from Tehran concerning this group: "... I am convinced that there is a strong possibility that the funds and the time which we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the U.S."

With respect to the areas from which these people have fled, it is important to note that, pursuant to present National Security Council policy, it is in the United States interest to encourage and exploit areas of potential friction between the USSR and Communist China. Sinkiang Province, which has long been a source of contention between Russia and China, is a notable example of such areas of political friction. In addition to its strategic location, Sinkiang has had a long history of resistance to both Chinese and Russian encroachment. The racial minority groups living there are among the most intensely nationalistic of Central Asia. Various ethnic groups in Sinkiang have made repeated appeals to United States officials, notably the late J. Hall Paxton, for United States moral, economic and political support. Considering the little help extended by the United States to these people, it is fortunate and, indeed, surprising that an opportunity still remains for cultivating their friendship and political assistance at relatively little cost. Intelligent assistance is not only desirable but, in the light of United States policy objectives, is imperative if the latent potential is to be utilized. In this connection, particular attention should be invited to the usefulness to the United States of a program providing assistance for settlement of anti-Communist escapees reasonably near the area from which they fled.

It should be emphasized, with reference to the questions which have been raised concerning the local resettlement aspects of the project, that the primary objective of the Escapee Program is to re-establish the individual escapees on a self-sufficient basis, so that he may regain his dignity and self-respect, and will no longer require relief assistance. In Europe, the countries of first asylum happen also to

be, with one or two possible exceptions, areas of surplus population. The means, therefore, for assisting the escapee must in general be onward migration to areas of expanding employment opportunity, such as Canada, Australia or Latin America. The Escapee Program has not, in consequence, engaged to any great degree in projects to resettle escapees locally in their European countries of refuge. Resettlement in Europe, however, has been recognized from the outset of the program as a possible alternative under certain circumstances. President Truman, in his message to the Congress of March 24, said: "Supplemental care and overseas migration do not, however, constitute all that should be done for those who escape from Eastern Europe. A substantial number of them want to stay in Europe and should have the chance to do so. They should be welcomed in Europe and given the opportunity to make their individual contributions to the free world."

In Kashmir, no similar unemployment exists among the local population to make the onward movement of refugees mandatory. This presents the definite alternative of local resettlement or integration for those refugees who prefer to remain close to their homeland. In this instance, the local resettlement can be accomplished by homestanding in rural Kashmir, and establishment in small business in Srinagar, at a per capita cost roughly equal to that of movement to Turkey. In my letter of September 15, 1952 to Mr. Harriman concerning this matter, it was pointed out that 153 refugees can be moved to Turkey for \$9,000, or approximately \$59 per capita, and 147 would be resettled locally per \$11,000, or approximately \$75 per capita. With reference to the method of administering the urban resettlement project for 68 Turkis, it is anticipated that small land or partnership arrangements would be worked out in individual cases by the administering voluntary agency. Where practicable, funds would be recovered from the local resettlers, and would be applied to further work among Central Asian refugees under provision of the contract between the United States Government and the administering voluntary agency.

In both the European program and the Kashmir project the objective is that of permanent establishment of the refugee under conditions favorable to self-dependence. In Europe, local conditions of unemployment among the indigenous populations recommend onward movement. In Kashmir, local resettlement is a feasible and inexpensive alternative, consistent with the wishes of many of the group. The proposal represents a practical solution, in light of prevailing local conditions, to this problem of selecting the means best calculated to serve the objective of the program.

With reference to the question of recurrent requests of this nature, I would call your attention to the fact that a small program for the Near East, South Asia and the Far East is included in the FY 1954 Escapee Program submission. Illustrative programs have been developed to specify the type of projects contemplated for these areas, and in the Near East local resettlement is clearly one of the means to be considered. It is assumed, therefore, that this matter will shortly be placed directly before the Congress for approval on a continuing basis. In the interim, I would again recommend your approval of this urgent project as being wholly consistent with the objectives of the Escapee Program as defined in basic Psychological Strategy Board documents and administered under section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and within the intent of legislative authority already available under section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

Edwin M. Martin
Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Mutual Security Affairs

CLEARANCES:

SOA¹¹⁸:FDCollins

CA:EWMartin

CA:WOAnderson

UNA¹¹⁹:

UNA:UNA/R¹²⁰:RMCashin:mit

10/27/52

¹¹⁸ Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State.

¹¹⁹ Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State.

¹²⁰ Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State.